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Abstract
The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) provides a mechanism for states to 
assist each other during natural disasters and other emergencies. Congress ratified EMAC in 1996, 
and all 50 states and 3 territories have adopted it. EMAC allows a state affected by a disaster to 
request personnel and materiel from another state. For personnel requests, EMAC provides that 
the requesting state cover the tort liability and the responding state cover the workers’ 
compensation liability. This article discusses the limitations of EMAC in deploying volunteers and 
how the Uniform Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioners Act and other provisions address 
those limitations.
Public health emergencies, including natural disasters such as tornados, hurricanes, floods, 
and forest fires, and man-made disasters, whether accidental or deliberate, can result in mass 
fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. These events create an upsurge in the need for health 
practitioners, but, unlike military, police, or fire resources, the government does not 
typically employ enough health professionals to meet a surge in demand, whether at the 
federal or state level. Therefore, reliance on volunteer health practitioners from the private 
sector is to be expected, and their availability should be facilitated. In an emergency that 
exceeds a state’s capacity to respond, it may be necessary to move volunteer health 
practitioners across state lines. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
was designed to enable states with resources to efficiently send assets, including people, to a 
state in need by addressing legal issues in advance.1 However, gaps left by EMAC have 
prevented the movement of volunteers, and specifically volunteer health practitioners (eg, 
doctors, nurses, veterinarians, and other health professionals), across state lines to deliver 
health services in response to emergencies, such as the hurricanes of 2005.2,3 The Uniform 
Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioner Act (UEVHPA) was drafted to address these gaps, 
but states have not adopted it consistently and instead must rely on a patchwork of state 
laws. This article describes EMAC’s history, coverage and gaps created by EMAC with 
regard to volunteer health practitioners’ liability and workers’ compensation, how UEVHPA 
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fills these gaps, alternative solutions states have adopted, and the role of mutual aid 
agreements in moving volunteer health practitioners across state lines during an emergency.
EMAC History and Overview
EMAC has roots in the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, which promoted the use of 
interstate mutual aid in response to emergencies. The legislation authorized the Federal Civil 
Defense Administrator to “assist and encourage the states to negotiate and enter into 
interstate civil defense compacts.”4 Despite minimal support and funding for civil defense, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator was granted similar 
authority in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Assistance Act of 1994.5 Interest in 
civil defense was renewed following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001.
Following Hurricane Andrew, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles, along with the Virginia 
Department of Emergency Services, worked with the governors of other southern states to 
develop the Southern Regional Emergency Management Assistance Compact (SREMAC); 
17 states, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico signed on to SREMAC in 1993.6
EMAC derived from SREMAC and was ratified by Congress in 1996.1 All 50 states, the 
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the US Virgin Islands have signed on to 
EMAC as members called “party states.” Although it is not a “uniform law,” EMAC has 
been enacted essentially intact by all party states.*
EMAC is administered by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA). Use 
of EMAC has grown significantly, as have requests through EMAC for personnel. In 2001, 
New York requested 26 support staff from other states through EMAC to respond to the 
terrorist attacks; in 2005, 66,000 personnel were deployed under EMAC to respond to 
Hurricane Katrina.7
EMAC provides a framework for party states to share assets including personnel, resources, 
and services across state lines during response to a governor-declared emergency. The 
requesting state (also referred to as the receiving or accepting state) retains state sovereignty 
and continues to lead the emergency response. The sending state (also referred to as the 
assisting or rendering state) responds to the request to the extent that it can continue to be 
capable of protecting its own state in an emergency.8 EMAC does not replace federal 
support.
EMAC helps expedite the response because key legal issues between the requesting and 
sending states, such as licensure, liability, workers’ compensation, and reimbursement, have 
been dealt with in advance of the emergency.
*
“Uniform” and “model” laws are terms of art. The Uniform Law Commission’s website defines these terms as follows: “A uniform 
state law is a statute that has been promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission. Although other organizations may adopt the term 
‘uniform’ when describing their own acts, generally, when the term ‘uniform’ is used, it is highly likely that it is a law that has been 
drafted and approved by the ULC. Besides uniform acts, the ULC also promulgates ‘model’ acts. A uniform act is one in which 
uniformity of the provisions of the act among the various jurisdictions is a principal and compelling objective. An act may be 
designated as ‘model’ if the principal purposes of the act can be substantially achieved even though it is not adopted in its entirety by 
every state.” http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Frequently Asked Questions. Accessed June 10, 2013.
Lopez et al. Page 2
Biosecur Bioterror. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 02.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
EMAC Coverage
EMAC’s Article I provides that party states may request assistance under EMAC for 
response to any governor-declared emergency or disaster, whether natural or man-made. 
Almost any asset can be moved across states lines under EMAC, including personnel. 
Volunteers, specifically volunteer health practitioners, present unique concerns under 
EMAC. Many health practitioners, such as doctors, nurses, and paramedics, are required to 
be licensed to practice in their home state. EMAC Article V states that a person who holds a 
professional license, certificate, or other permit in the sending state will be deemed licensed, 
certified, or permitted by the requesting state. The governor of the requesting state may 
impose limitations or conditions on professional licenses, certificates, or permits through 
executive orders or other mechanisms.9
While the sending state commands emergency forces, functionally they are under the 
operational control of the requesting state according to EMAC Article IV.10 Under EMAC 
Article VI, “officers or employees” of the sending state are considered “agents of the 
requesting state for tort liability and immunity purposes.” The sending state and its “officers 
or employees” cannot be held liable for their actions or omissions while assisting with the 
response. This provision excludes willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness.11 
As outlined in EMAC Article VIII, party states must provide workers’ compensation and 
death benefits to “members of emergency forces of that state” regardless of whether the 
injury occurred outside of the member’s home state.12
While EMAC provides the groundwork, it anticipates supplemental agreements under 
Article VII. These mutual aid agreements can be drafted prior to an emergency, in 
contemplation of a future response, or at the time of the response to tailor the response to the 
needs of the party states at that time. Mutual aid agreements can restrict or expand the 
existing EMAC provisions or address legal issues not considered by EMAC.
EMAC Article IX says that the requesting state must reimburse the sending state for 
expenses incurred while responding under EMAC. The sending state may assume the costs 
or donate service in whole or in part. Mutual aid agreements may establish a different cost 
allocation between the sending and receiving states than what is outlined in Article IX, with 
the exception that the sending state cannot be reimbursed for costs associated with workers’ 
compensation or death benefits as stated in Article VIII.
Gaps in Coverage
Under EMAC Article VI, the sending state and its “officers or employees” receive immunity 
from liability resulting from acts or omissions performed in good faith (ie, not willful 
misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness).13 The officers and employees of the sending 
state are considered agents of the requesting state, and the requesting state may be 
vicariously liable (ie, the state can be held liable in place of an officer or employee on the 
theory that a principal is responsible for the acts of its agent). However, most healthcare 
practitioners are not government employees. Unless a sending state’s laws deem volunteers 
to be employees for liability purposes, EMAC does not stand as a sufficient framework for 
deploying its volunteer health practitioners out of state because the sending state and its 
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volunteer health practitioners are exposed to liability, and volunteer health practitioners and 
other volunteers will likely not be deployed to render assistance. The requesting state will be 
deprived of much needed assistance.
Under EMAC Article VIII, a sending state must provide for the payment of workers’ 
compensation and death benefits to “members” of the sending state’s emergency forces who 
are injured or killed. Compensation must be made in the same manner as if the injury or 
death occurred in the sending state. EMAC does not clarify whether a volunteer, or, more 
specifically, a volunteer health practitioner, can be deemed a “member” of the sending 
state’s emergency force and therefore entitled to workers’ compensation. This may have a 
chilling effect on volunteer health practitioner and other volunteer recruitment. A receiving 
state may again be deprived of needed assistance from sending states.
Mechanisms to Address the Gaps
To address the liability and workers’ compensation coverage issues for volunteer health 
practitioners left open by EMAC, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
State Laws (NCCUSL) approved and recommended that states enact the Uniform 
Emergency Volunteer Health Practitioner Act (UEVHPA) in 2007.14 UEVHPA is written 
from the perspective of a “receiving” state. It applies to volunteer health practitioners who 
are providing health or veterinary services for a host entity in a state that has declared an 
emergency during the pendency of such an emergency, and it allows volunteer health 
practitioners to practice in that state if they are licensed and in good standing in another 
state.15
To date, the UEVHPA has been enacted by 15 jurisdictions consisting of 13 states, the 
District of Columbia, and the US Virgin Islands. Although it is called a “uniform” law, it has 
been treated as a model law to the extent that enacting jurisdictions have often modified the 
suggested language in order to adapt it to particular circumstances or the jurisdiction’s 
existing legal framework. To minimize confusion, we will refer to the NCCUSL version as 
the “model UEVHPA” or the “Act” and identify the enacted versions by state (eg, “the 
Indiana UEVHPA”).
The Act applies to volunteer health practitioners who are registered with a qualified 
registration system providing a health or veterinary service for a host entity, which can be 
any legal or commercial entity, including corporations, governments, government 
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities operating in the receiving state, in response to a 
declared emergency.16 Furthermore, an authorized agency of the receiving state, such as the 
emergency management agency, may incorporate volunteer health practitioners who are not 
officers or employees of the state or political subdivision into the emergency forces of the 
state, presumably even if they are from outside the state.17 Therefore, it would appear that a 
covered volunteer health practitioner must either be affiliated with some kind of disaster 
relief organization or government instrumentality authorized to operate in the receiving 
state, whether or not such host agency is from within the receiving state or outside the 
receiving state, or be incorporated into the emergency forces of the receiving state as set 
forth above. An unaffiliated or unincorporated individual who shows up spontaneously at a 
disaster site and helps would not be deemed a volunteer health practitioner under the Act.
Lopez et al. Page 4
Biosecur Bioterror. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 02.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Liability Protections Under the Model UEVHPA
With regard to liability of volunteer health practitioners, the Act offers 2 alternative versions 
of Section 11 for enacting jurisdictions to consider. Alternative A provides immunity from 
liability to volunteer health practitioners for their acts or omissions, excluding willful 
misconduct, intentional torts, breaches of contract, and others.18 Alternative A also provides 
that no person, such as a host entity, a sending state, or a requesting state, shall be 
vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of the volunteer health practitioners if the 
volunteer is not liable.19 Alternative B also provides immunity from liability to volunteer 
health practitioners, but suggests a monetary cap of $500 on the amount of compensation the 
volunteer can receive for providing the voluntary services. Reimbursement of expenses or 
continuation of salary while on leave is not considered compensation. Again, the same 
exclusions apply.20
Alternative A provides broader liability protection because it specifies that there is no 
vicarious liability and it does not have any limiting language based on monetary 
compensation. On the other hand, Alternative B clarifies that continuation of salary while on 
leave, a circumstance that may apply to volunteer health practitioners, does not constitute 
compensation. Both alternatives resolve the problem presented by EMAC because they 
clearly protect volunteers who are not “officers or employees” of the sending state; however, 
Alternative B restricts this protection to only those receiving less than $500, which appears 
to be inconsistent with the general definition of volunteer health practitioners. The general 
definition specifies that “volunteer health practitioner” means “a health practitioner who 
provides health or veterinary services,” whether or not the practitioner receives 
compensation for those services.21
Parenthetically, a receiving state’s statutes may grant total immunity to the volunteer health 
practitioner with no vicarious liability exposure for the state (Alternative A), or it may grant 
immunity to the volunteer (no personal liability) with the state left responsible for defense 
and indemnification, for acts or omissions performed within the state (Alternative B). But a 
sending state may not unilaterally extend immunity to its volunteer health practitioners for 
acts performed and litigated outside of the state. It would be manifestly unjust for a person 
negligently injured in one state to have no recourse to the courts of that state solely because 
the laws of another state grant immunity to an allegedly negligent out-of-state actor. 
EMAC’s Article VI grant of immunity to the officers and employees of a sending state is 
effective because all states, including all possible receiving states, have enacted EMAC.
While a statute would likely be necessary to vest any kind of immunity on an individual or 
the state, it is possible that an administrative agency would have the inherent authority, or 
obligation, even without a specific statute, to extend defense and indemnification protections 
to its agents acting under its supervision and control either within or outside the state. For 
receiving states that have not enacted the UEVHPA, it may be worth exploring whether they 
could nevertheless contractually offer defense and indemnification to authorized in-state or 
out-of-state volunteers coming to their assistance and acting under their supervision and 
control. The ability to do so would need to be vetted and approved by the appropriate 
authorities. Of course, it is always better to have a comprehensive statute, such as the 
UEVHPA, that resolves these and other issues.
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Workers’ Compensation Protections
Regarding workers’ compensation, Section 12 of the Act provides that a volunteer health 
practitioner who dies or is injured as a result of providing health or veterinary services 
pursuant to the Act is deemed an employee of the receiving state for the purpose of 
receiving workers’ compensation benefits under the law of that state.22 Section 12 makes the 
receipt of such workers’ compensation benefits contingent on the volunteer health 
practitioners’ not being eligible for such benefits under the law of another state and on the 
volunteers’ electing coverage under the receiving state’s law.23 If an injured volunteer 
health practitioner were eligible for workers’ compensation benefits from the sending state 
(eg, because the law of the sending state extended the benefits to volunteer health 
practitioners), they could not receive benefits from the receiving state under Section 12.
Subsection (c) of Section 12 requires an appropriate agency of the receiving state to adopt 
rules, enter into agreements with other states, or otherwise facilitate the receipt of workers’ 
compensation benefits by volunteer health practitioners who reside in other states. For states 
that have enacted the UEVHPA, a receiving state would be responsible for the payment of 
workers’ compensation benefits to out-of-state volunteer health practitioners not otherwise 
eligible for such benefits. Therefore, the UEVHPA addresses the gap left open by EMAC 
Articles VIII and IX relative to volunteers. States considering adoption of UEVHPA must 
identify existing state statutory limitations on workers’ compensation benefits to ensure 
consistency with UEVHPA.
Mutual Aid Agreements
Mutual aid agreements between states can be useful in addressing issues of interstate 
cooperation in circumstances that do not rise to the level of governor-declared 
emergencies.24 As demonstrated in the state examples we set forth below, mutual aid 
agreements can be necessary to clarify matters that may arise in response to declared 
emergencies but which may be left open by EMAC and UEVHPA.
One potential obstacle to interstate mutual aid agreements that may appear burdensome to 
states is the Compact Clause of the US Constitution, which states, “No state shall, without 
the consent of Congress,… enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a 
foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will 
not admit of delay.”25 However, the Compact Clause’s limitation is not as absolute as it may 
seem. In 1981, the US Supreme Court ruled in Cuyler v Adams that
Congressional consent is not required for interstate agreements that fall outside the 
scope of the Compact Clause. Where an agreement is not “directed to the formation 
of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which 
may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States,” it 
does not fall within the scope of the Clause and will not be invalidated for lack of 
congressional consent.26
The Cuyler Court was quoting from Virginia v Tennessee, the seminal Supreme Court case 
on the Compact Clause. Most interestingly, in discussing what kinds of issues do not 
encroach upon federal authority, that 1893 decision stated:
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So, in case of threatened invasion of cholera, plague, or other causes of sickness 
and death, it would be the height of absurdity to hold that the threatened states 
could not unite in providing means to prevent and repel the invasion of the 
pestilence without obtaining the consent of congress, which might not be at the 
time in session.27
Accordingly, a strong argument can be made that the mutual aid agreements contemplated 
here do not encroach on federal authority, especially to the extent that they involve the use 
of volunteer health practitioners as state assets in emergencies. Even if responding to 
federally declared emergencies were deemed to be FEMA’s responsibility, it is unlikely that 
states would be prohibited from entering into agreements for the use of their own resources, 
or those of their agreeable sister states, in response to strictly state-declared emergencies.
Alternatively, the 1996 congressional ratification of EMAC, including its Article VII, which 
recognizes the need for supplementary agreements among the states, provides another 
rationale for why actual congressional pre-approval of every interstate mutual aid agreement 
under these circumstances may be unnecessary. As the Supreme Court said in Cuyler, 449 
US at 441, “Congress may consent to an interstate compact by authorizing joint state action 
in advance or by giving expressed or implied approval to an agreement the States have 
already joined.” EMAC Article VII could conceivably be viewed as constructive approval of 
these kinds of interstate mutual aid agreements by Congress, if approval were deemed 
necessary. In addition, if more concrete congressional approval is deemed advisable under 
the circumstances, the Stafford Act provides a mechanism to obtain such approval. Interstate 
emergency preparedness compacts can be transmitted to Congress, and its approval is 
deemed granted 60 days after its transmittal, but approval can be denied or withdrawn at any 
time.28,29 Of course, whether and what kind of approval would be necessary is subject to the 
legal evaluation and determination of appropriate authorities, such as state attorneys general 
or federal authorities.
Case Studies of State Laws
States have chosen different ways to address volunteer health practitioner liability and 
workers’ compensation concerns. The descriptions below provide case study examples of 
how 4 states have addressed these issues. Two of the chosen states have enacted versions of 
UEVHPA (Indiana and Utah), and 2 have relied on other laws (New York and Florida). The 
states were chosen based on the variation in their treatment of UEVHPA, the authors’ 
knowledge of the state laws, and the generous cooperation of the state public health 
attorneys.
Indiana
Indiana’s UEVHPA, found at Chapter 3.5 of Article 14 of Title 10 of the Indiana Code, 
omits the liability and workers’ compensation provisions of the model UEVHPA. Instead, 
provisions offering protection for volunteers are found in Indiana’s Emergency Management 
and Disaster Law at Chapter 3 of Article 14 of Title 10 of the Indiana Code. These 2 bodies 
of law should be read together as encompassing the essence of the model UEVHPA.
Lopez et al. Page 7
Biosecur Bioterror. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2015 December 02.
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Author M
anuscript
Liability and workers’ compensation as a sending state—Indiana Mobile Support 
Unit members (MSUMs) may be “unemployed, retired, self-employed, or employed.”30 
MSUMs are considered emergency management workers entitled to the rights and 
immunities of an employee, including immunity from liability and at least some workers’ 
compensation benefits if they are not otherwise entitled to such benefits. For example, 
MSUMs working as authorized emergency management workers who are unemployed or 
self-employed volunteers may be limited to benefits covering medical treatment and burial 
expenses.31 Furthermore, MSUMs who are not employees of Indiana and are deployed 
outside the state under EMAC are considered employees of Indiana for purposes of the 
compact.32 Therefore, under EMAC, Indiana can deploy Indiana volunteer health 
practitioners to other states as employees of Indiana for purposes of EMAC and derive all of 
the liability protections of EMAC for the volunteers as well as for the state of Indiana. If the 
deployment were to a state that had enacted Alternative A of the model UEVHPA, then the 
receiving state would also be immune from liability. Consistent with the intent of EMAC 
Article VIII, Indiana volunteer health practitioners who are injured while deployed to 
another state, and who are not otherwise eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, would 
be covered for medical treatment and burial expenses.
Liability and workers’ compensation as a receiving state—The definition of an 
Indiana “emergency management worker” includes a volunteer of Indiana or of another 
state, US territory or possession, any neighboring country, or any agency or organization 
performing emergency management services in Indiana. The definition also includes a 
volunteer health practitioner registered under Indiana’s UEVHPA provisions.33 
Accordingly, although applicability of liability and workers’ compensation laws is heavily 
fact dependent, Indiana statutes place out-of-state volunteers rendering assistance in Indiana 
within the ambit of liability protections and the limited workers’ compensation benefits 
offered to authorized emergency management workers under the Indiana Emergency 
Management and Disaster Law.34
This array of statutory protections offers Indiana an excellent opportunity to enter into 
mutual aid agreements with a variety of jurisdictions, including states that have or have not 
enacted the model UEVHPA, clarifying responsibilities so as to minimize Indiana’s 
exposure as a sending state. Mutual aid agreements can also offer Indiana protections and 
benefits to other states in order to encourage states to assist Indiana as a receiving state if the 
need arises.
Utah
Utah’s version of UEVHPA is found in Chapter 49 of Utah’s Health Code, Title 26 of the 
Utah Code. It provides, “An authorized representative of a party state may incorporate 
volunteer health practitioners into the emergency forces of Utah even if those volunteer 
health practitioners are not officers or employees of Utah.…”35 This language is similar, but 
not identical, to the language of the model UEVHPA, Subsection 9(b), which specifically 
references EMAC. Therefore, one would assume that the term “party state” here carries the 
same meaning as in EMAC. Clearly, this language authorizes a Utah representative to 
incorporate Utah volunteer health practitioners into the emergency forces of Utah. It is 
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reasonable to conclude that it also authorizes a representative of another state sending 
assistance to Utah, presumably with the affirmative authorization of Utah, to incorporate 
out-of-state volunteer health practitioners into Utah’s emergency forces.
Liability as a sending state—Unlike Indiana, there is no express Utah provision 
deeming volunteer health practitioners to be employees for liability purposes. A volunteer 
health practitioner incorporated into the Utah emergency forces pursuant to the 
aforementioned subsection 301(b) can arguably be viewed as the functional equivalent of a 
Utah employee and, therefore, can be deployed outside of Utah with the immunity from 
liability provided by Utah law and extended out of state by EMAC Article VI.
However, there is no precedent for this sort of deployment by Utah. If Utah were to deploy a 
volunteer health practitioner incorporated into its emergency forces to a state that had 
enacted the UEVHPA, then that volunteer would be immune from liability pursuant to the 
receiving state’s version of the model UEVHPA’s Section 11 even if the volunteer were not 
deemed an employee of Utah under EMAC. But if Utah was asked to deploy a volunteer 
health practitioner incorporated into its emergency forces to a non-UEVHPA state, and did 
not want to rely on the possibility that the volunteer would be deemed a Utah employee for 
EMAC Article VI liability protection purposes, then it is likely that Utah would not deploy 
that volunteer unless Utah and the receiving state entered into a mutual aid agreement 
whereby the receiving state, pursuant to its own laws if possible, assumed responsibility for 
any liability that might result from the Utah volunteer’s acts or omissions in the receiving 
state.
Workers’ compensation as a sending state—Contrary to the provisions applicable to 
liability, the Utah UEVHPA considers a volunteer health practitioner to be a state employee 
for the purpose of receiving workers’ compensation medical benefits and requires Utah to 
provide volunteers with workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation 
Act and the Utah Occupational Disease Act.36 Therefore, Utah volunteer health practitioners 
incorporated into its emergency forces would be eligible to receive workers’ compensation 
benefits under Utah law. This approach is consistent with EMAC because EMAC Article 
VIII provides coverage for “members of the emergency forces” and does not limit protection 
to “officers and or employees.” If Utah deployed Utah volunteers incorporated into its 
emergency forces to a state that had enacted the model UEVHPA’s Section 12, Utah’s 
volunteers could not avail themselves of that other state’s benefits because they would be 
eligible to receive Utah benefits.
Liability and workers’ compensation as a receiving state—Utah provides 
immunity from civil liability to volunteer health practitioners providing health or veterinary 
services in Utah pursuant to the Utah UEVHPA. However, the Utah immunities’ construct is 
different from either Alternative A or B of the model Act.37 If the law of a state sending 
volunteer health practitioners to Utah viewed the volunteers as employees of the sending 
state, and the assistance was being provided under EMAC, then the volunteer health 
practitioners would be deemed agents of Utah, with the volunteers and the sending state 
protected from liability and Utah potentially responsible for liability resulting from the acts 
or omissions of the volunteers under EMAC Article VI.
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As indicated above, Utah’s UEVHPA is less clear on the question of “no vicarious liability” 
than is Alternative A of Section 11 of the model Act. Even if a sending state’s law did not 
recognize volunteer health practitioners as employees and, therefore, EMAC immunity was 
not available under EMAC Article VI, Utah’s UEVHPA provides immunity to out-of-state 
volunteers.38 Accordingly, Utah may enter into mutual aid agreements with neighboring 
jurisdictions offering them liability immunity in order to encourage assistance if needed. 
Indeed, for the 2002 Winter Olympics, prior to Utah’s enactment of its UEVHPA in 2008, 
Utah entered into mutual aid agreements with Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and 
Arizona extending liability protection to volunteer health practitioners from those states.
While EMAC Article VIII makes a sending state responsible for payments associated with 
workers’ compensation benefits to members of its emergency forces serving in another state, 
and EMAC Article IX makes those expenses nonreimbursable by the receiving state under 
EMAC, Utah’s UEVHPA does allow it to cover out-of-state volunteer health practitioners 
for such benefits. Unlike the model UEVHPA’s Section 12, which makes such coverage 
available only if the out-of-state volunteer health practitioner is not otherwise eligible for 
workers’ compensation benefits, Utah’s corresponding provision does not have such limiting 
language. Therefore, out-of-state volunteers could be eligible to receive Utah benefits 
whether or not they are eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits from the sending 
state. If a volunteer health practitioner is eligible for benefits from the sending state, he or 
she would have to elect which state’s benefits to claim. Or a mutual aid agreement between 
such states could clarify the issue beforehand. Similar to the model UEVHPA’s Subsection 
12(c), Utah law requires Utah’s Labor Commission to adopt rules, enter into agreements 
with other states, or take other measures to facilitate receipt of benefits by volunteer health 
practitioners who reside in other states.39
New York
In the absence of a UEVHPA-like statute, it is likely that there are gaps related to liability or 
workers’ compensation that may not be capable of being filled even with the creative use of 
existing laws and mutual aid agreements.
Liability protections as a receiving state—The New York State Defense Emergency 
Act (SDEA) provides immunity from liability to the “state, any political subdivision, 
municipal or volunteer agency, or another state or a civil defense force thereof or of the 
federal government or of another country or province or subdivision thereof, performing 
civil defense services in [New York State] pursuant to an arrangement, agreement or 
compact for mutual aid and assistance, or any agency, member, agent or representative of 
any of them.…”40 However, “civil defense” services are limited to those taken in 
preparation for, during, or in response to “attacks” such as the terrorist attack on the World 
Trade Center.
The New York State and Local Natural and Man-Made Disaster Preparedness Law (Disaster 
Law) extends the same powers, duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as are applicable 
under the New York SDEA to “disaster emergency response personnel.”41 “Disaster 
emergency response personnel” include “agencies, public officers, employees, or affiliated 
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volunteers having duties and responsibilities under or pursuant to a comprehensive 
emergency management plan.”42 Therefore, it would seem that, as a receiving state, New 
York law provides immunity from liability to volunteer health practitioners, whether they 
are from New York or out-of-state volunteers, as long as they are properly affiliated disaster 
emergency response personnel.
Liability protections as a sending state—It is possible that New York volunteer 
health practitioners deployed out of state could be protected under the above-cited 
provisions of the Disaster Law if, for example, such out-of-state deployment were 
contemplated in the state’s comprehensive emergency management plan. In addition, the 
New York Public Officers Law requires the state to provide defense and indemnification to 
employees of the state and public entities, respectively.43 The definition of “employee” in 
Section 17 includes “a volunteer expressly authorized to participate in a state-sponsored 
volunteer program,…” and Section 18 defines “employee” to include “a volunteer expressly 
authorized to participate in a publicly sponsored volunteer program.…” It is unknown 
whether these provisions, intended for purposes of providing defense and indemnification, 
would be sufficient to deem New York volunteers deployed out of state as employees of the 
state for the purposes of EMAC Article VI liability protection to sending states. A mutual 
aid agreement, properly vetted by the attorney general and relying on these statutes for 
authority, could clarify this issue and articulate mutually agreeable terms consistent 
therewith.
Workers’ compensation as a receiving and a sending state—The New York 
SDEA specifies that “the provisions of this section shall not affect the right of any person to 
receive benefits to which he may be entitled under the workers’ compensation law,… nor 
the right of any person to receive any benefits or compensation under any act of congress or 
under any law of this state.”44 New York’s Workers’ Compensation Law provides workers’ 
compensation benefits to “civil defense volunteers,” defined as members of the civil defense 
forces under the provisions of the SDEA who are volunteers serving without compensation 
“in the personnel of volunteer agencies.”45 Viewing New York as a receiving state, it would 
appear, then, that volunteer health practitioners, whether from New York or not, who are 
personnel of volunteer agencies and provide services in New York related to an “attack” are 
eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. Whether such volunteer health practitioners 
responding to a natural or man-made disaster in New York would be eligible for such 
benefits by virtue of the Disaster Law’s extension of rights and privileges is unclear. If 
properly affiliated New York volunteer health practitioners were somehow incorporated into 
the emergency forces of New York and were deployed to another state pursuant to EMAC, it 
is possible that they would be deemed eligible for New York workers’ compensation 
benefits pursuant to EMAC Article VIII. Again, a mutual aid agreement could clarify these 
points.
Florida
Liability protections as a sending or receiving state—Florida Statutes Chapter 110 
covers state employment, and Part IV of Chapter 110 relates to volunteers. “ ‘Volunteer’ 
means any person who, of his or her own free will, provides goods or services … to any 
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state department or agency, or nonprofit organization, with no monetary or material 
compensation.”46 Section 110.504, relating to volunteer benefits, dictates that “Volunteers 
shall be covered by state liability protection in accordance with … the provisions of Section 
768.28.”47 That section specifies that no officer, employee, or agent of the state shall be 
personally liable for acts or omissions performed in the course of employment or function, 
and that the exclusive remedy shall be an action against the government entity.48 Therefore, 
volunteers, including volunteer health practitioners, providing services to a state agency 
would appear to be protected from personal liability, with the state being obligated to defend 
and indemnify the volunteer health practitioners. However, the above-cited section 110.504 
also states that “Volunteers shall be covered by s. 768.1355, the Florida Volunteer 
Protection Act.”49 That statute is inconsistent with the aforementioned Subsection 768.28(9) 
in that it not only exempts from protection acts or omissions of wanton or willful 
misconduct, as many other statutes do, but also limits protection to volunteers acting as an 
ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances.50 In effect, 
this language appears to exclude volunteer health practitioners committing acts of simple 
negligence from being protected. If true, this could severely restrict Florida’s ability to 
attract volunteer health practitioners, whether from Florida or from out-of-state, to its 
service and assistance. However, volunteers who are activated and deployed by the Florida 
Department of Health are agents of the state and may be protected from simple negligence 
pursuant to §768.28(9).
From a sending state’s perspective, Florida may be able to identify some mechanism that 
would allow Florida volunteer health practitioners to be deemed state employees for EMAC 
liability protection purposes, such as classifying them as “Other Personnel Services” 
employees. From a receiving state’s perspective, clarifying that volunteer health 
practitioners are protected from liability resulting from simple negligence would benefit 
Florida and greatly facilitate volunteers and other states coming to its aid. Properly vetted 
and duly authorized mutual aid agreements would seem to be indispensable in such a 
complicated statutory environment.
Workers’ compensation as a sending or receiving state—The aforementioned 
Florida Volunteer Benefits section makes clear that “Volunteers shall be covered by 
workers’ compensation in accordance with chapter 440.”51 Consistent with the above-cited 
definition of “volunteer,” Florida volunteer health practitioners providing services to a state 
agency in Florida would be covered for workers’ compensation benefits, and they would 
likely also be covered if they were providing services outside of Florida pursuant to EMAC 
if they were incorporated into Florida’s emergency forces. This statutory language might 
also cover out-of-state volunteers assisting a Florida state agency under EMAC if they were 
not otherwise eligible for workers’ compensation benefits. However, a mutual aid agreement 
would definitely be useful to clarify these and other complicated issues.
Conclusion
EMAC is a useful and necessary vehicle for interstate assistance, but it leaves gaps that must 
be addressed through supplementary agreements, as contemplated by Articles III and VII, 
particularly with regard to voluntary health practitioners. UEVHPA provides potential 
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solutions to many issues related to volunteer health practitioners, including liability 
protections and workers’ compensation benefits, but variations among states that have 
enacted a version of UEVHPA, as well as the inevitable need for mutual assistance between 
UEVHPA and non-UEVHPA states, make mutual aid agreements that clarify respective 
rights and obligations, particularly with regard to these protections and benefits, useful and 
necessary tools.
States that have not enacted UEVHPA are nevertheless likely to have statutes that address 
emergency management issues, including liability protections and workers’ compensation 
benefits, and they may even address volunteers to some degree. How these myriad 
provisions interact with EMAC and with the statutes of other states, whether UEVHPA or 
non-UEVHPA states, can present confounding and paralyzing dilemmas in a time of crisis. 
This makes the development of well thought out, legally vetted, and properly authorized 
mutual aid agreements before the fact imperative.
As with any contract, the purpose must be to clearly articulate the meeting of the minds and 
not to obfuscate apparently binding commitments. For example, an agreement that said, 
“Volunteer health practitioners shall be protected from liability in accordance with 
applicable provisions of law in the state of …” leaves too many possibilities open to future 
interpretations. More clear and binding would be language such as, “It is the position of the 
state of X that volunteer health practitioners providing assistance in this state are [immune 
from liability or entitled to defense and indemnification] pursuant to the provisions of 
[identified statutes]. In reliance thereon, the state of Y hereby agrees to deploy its duly 
authorized volunteer health practitioners to render assistance in the state of X.”
The interpretations of the various statutes presented above are not intended to provide 
definitive legal opinions but rather to point out language that might be considered in an 
effort to offer the greatest degree of liability protection and workers’ compensation benefits 
to volunteer health practitioners. Using mutual aid agreements where possible, as an 
alternative to additional legislation, could facilitate these efforts and help achieve these 
goals. Although work has been published on mutual aid agreements and cross-jurisdictional 
coordination,29,52,53 further scholarship is needed to address the applicability and mechanics 
of mutual aid agreements to address the liability concerns of volunteer health practitioners 
and their relationship to EMAC.
It is assumed that augmenting and clarifying these protections and benefits in properly 
vetted and duly authorized and executed mutual aid agreements will maximize the 
availability and willingness of volunteer health practitioners to provide assistance in times of 
emergency.
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